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Post-separation Quebec's NAFTA Accession: Un Blocage Permanent?
by Ryan Geoffrey Baker
INTRODUCTION

The world is becoming increasingly interdependent.

of the U.S. borders, less attention was given to our northern
neighbor, Canada. Ironically, the threat of politics adversely

As interdependence among states increases, so does the number

affecting economics, specifically the trade relationship, is cur-

and significance of international treaties. Treaties involve any

rently greatest in Canada. Quebec, a province of Canada,

number of states and can be political, economic, or both.

threatens secession, and their threat is becoming more and

Because the international system is not static, but is constantly

more serious. In 1980, a referendum on Quebec secession

shifting as states change in number and power, treaties are often

lost, 60 percent voting against Quebec sovereignty. In 1995,

tested by changes in circumstance. International law develops

however, the margin of victory for the federalists was a mere

as treaty members establish customary precedent, solving dilem~

1.2 percent, 49.4 percent voting "yes" and 50.6 percent vot~

mas presented to them by changing circumstances.

ing "no" on the secession issue (Farnsworth 1995, A~I).

The case of Quebec and the North American Free

Any political disturbance north of U.S. borders

Trade Agreement (NAFTA) provides an interesting example of

directly affects the United States because the U.S.~Canada

this phenomenon. In this paper, I will address the status of an

trade relationship is the largest in the world. In 1995, this

independent Quebec relative to NAFTA. Doing this provides

relationship produced $330 billion in trade (U.S. Department

an illustration of the establishment of international legal

of State I 996, Internet). Quebec is a major contributor to

precedent. First I will present a brief summary of Quebec's

U.S.~Canada trade. In fact, Quebec does more trade with

political and economic background. Next, I will analyze the

many Northeastern states than the rest of Canada and Mexico

separatists' arguments and the NAFTA text. Finally, I will

together. The province's 6.9 million people make up 25 per~

consider Quebec's probable course and briefly discuss its

cent of Canada's population, and Quebec is Canada's largest

international law implications.

geographic province. Quebec's geographic size represents
great potential wealth because, according to the World Bank,

BACKGROUND

On 17 December 1992, the United States, Canada,

69 percent of Canada's national wealth is in its natural
resources (1992, Annex I). Overall, Quebec's economy con~

and Mexico signed NAFTA, forming the largest free~trade

stitutes one fourth of Canada's economic base (Bookman

bloc in the world. This event is part of an international

1992, 54). Thus, it is certain that any change in the

trend-freer trade through regional, multilateral treaties.

province's political or economic structure, especially the sort

Although discussion continues over the possible accession of

that would result from secession, would reverberate south of

additional countries, and President Clinton has expressed a

the border. Actually, NAFTA assures such reverberations;

desire to form a Hemispheric Trade Zone, additional NAFTA

some claim that a Quebec secession would throw the U.S.~

membership is unlikely, at least in the near future. For the

Canada and the U.S.~Qu€bec trade relationship into a bind

time being and the near future, NAFTA will be a trilateral

for five to ten years (Fry 1997).

treaty between its original members.
At the time of the signing, there was great concern

Quebec's secession would not only involve internal
costs, it would also be costly to the United States, Mexico, and

over Mexico's socio~political stability. Many worried that

the rest of Canada. Because trade involves mutual benefits, the

Mexico's unstable political system would be a detriment to

lack of trade forfeits benefits; this is especially costly when

NAFTA because of Mexico's economy, which remains vulnera~

people rely upon such benefits for their livelihood. If Quebec

ble to political turmoil. With such a focus on problems south

trade was eliminated or seriously hindered, the entire market
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would suffer. In addition, a political-economic NAFTA crisis,

Quebec is responsible for is unclear, Canada may grant

even on a small scale, may drive investors away from the North

Quebec access to its trade markets only if the Quebecois

American market, causing some to invest in Europe instead

assume a large portion of the debt. Although Canada is in the

(Barnhart 1995). Even temporary exclusion and re-entry

stronger position, Quebec brings some chips to the table as

negotiations will involve significant costs for Quebec and the

well. Concerning the debt issue, Quebec could threaten

entire North American market. Perhaps the Quebecois accept

refusal to pay for any of it unless a bilateral trade agreement

these costs as the price of their desired freedoms.

were implemented. Another potential cost to Canada from
excluding Quebec is a devalued currency. Quebec uses the

SEPARATIST ARGUMENTS

The implications of Quebec's separation have not

Canadian dollar, and they claim they will continue to do so
after separation. If Quebec is uses the Canadian dollar and

gone unconsidered by separatist leaders. Separatists-primar-

Canada continues to isolate Quebec's economy, Canada would,

ily leaders of the Bloc Quebecois, Parliament's opposition

in a sense, be shooting itself in the foot. The probability of

party. and the Parti Quebecois, Quebec's majority party-

each of these events taking place remains in question; there-

counter the costly NAFTA exclusion argument with the pro-

fore, the validity of the first separatist assumption also

posal of an immediate post-secession Quebec-Canada trade

remains in question.

agreement. In fact. the text of the most recent referendum

The second separatist assumption, Quebec will gain

question conditioned separation on a Quebec-Canada eco-

NAFTA access. is also uncertain. NAFTA's accession clause

nomic union. This, according to separatists would allow

requires unanimous consent, giving each member veto power.

Quebec to access Canada's markets until full NAFTA access

Thus, Canada could also prevent Quebec from entering

was negotiated. Following such negotiations, they claim,

NAFTA. Quebec could then turn to the United States for

Quebec would gain access to the agreement on terms similar

support, but such support may not be found because of U.S.

to

those is now enjoys.
The separatists make several assumptions in their

concern over the larger trade relationship. The separatists
argue that because of Quebec's robust economy and trade,

arguments. First. they assume that a Canada-Quebec free-

they will be a natural NAFTA addition. While the strength of

trade agreement would be acceptable to Canada. Second, they

Quebec's economy may be obvious today, separation, involving

assume that Quebec will gain access to NAFTA. Finally, they

currency and debt problems, may considerably weaken it.

assume that Quebec's eventual NAFTA access will be on terms

The final assumption made by the Quebecois sepa-

similar to those currently enjoyed. These assumptions are

ratists is Quebec's NAFTA accession, when it comes, will be

questionable and may all be denied in the course of events.

on favorable terms-terms similar to those Quebec currently

The first separatist assumption, the possibility of a

enjoys relative to other NAFTA markets. This seems particu-

Quebec-Canada trade agreement. is problematic. Quebec's

larly unlikely for political and economic reasons. Each mem-

secession would not please Canadians nor would it please

ber-state has veto power, and it is certain that each state will

Parliament. If such an action embitters Western Canada, a

use this power to secure concessions from Quebec. Currently,

bilateral trade agreement will be less likely. Canada will retain

NAFTA members grant several concessions to various

its NAFTA membership and will not be as dependent on

Quebecois markets. For example, the dairy farmers of Quebec

Quebec's trride. retaining at lerist three-fourths of its econom-

arc protected by a set of import restrictions and tariffs

ic base. The Canadirins may use this leverage to punish

(NAFTA 1992, Annex 703.2). This, according to dairy farm-

Quebec or to secure concessions. For instance, the Canadian

ers of the Northeastern U.S., is driving them out of business

government is saddled with an immense debt, much of which

(Fry 1996). Most of Quebec's industry fears any renegotia-

they attribute to Quebec. While the exact figure of debt that

tions because of probable added restrictions.
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Each Separatist assumption is questionable. While
they may hold true, there is no guarantee. It is certain that

however, Quebec secedes, severing itself from Canada's customs laws, it would no longer be a NAFTA member.

Quebec will not have an easy road to NAFTA accession.

According to NAFTA, "A party may withdraw from

Regardless of Quebec's present economic strength, future inter-

lthe 1 agreement

national political and economic factors may block Quebec from

withdrawal to the other parties. If a party withdraws, the

becoming the fourth NAFTA member. Indeed, a sovereign

Agreement shall remain in force for the remaining parties"

Quebec could encounter a blocage permanent from NAFTA.

(NAFTA 1992, Article 2205). There are no special clauses

six months after it provides written notice of

for state fragmentation. Thus, only the original member-gov-

NAFTA's TEXT
Because NAFTA is a treaty among three nations,

ernment retains its membership, and only this government is
bound by the six-month rule. Therefore, Quebec will not

international law allows these three nations to formulate the

enjoy six months of additional membership, and for the pur-

treaty's conditions, as long as they conform to prevailing

poses of the treaty, nothing will have changed-the agreement

international standards. The parties are not bound to give

will remain trilateral between its three original members.

external states any concessions, or, in this case, access to the

External states must rely solely on member-states'

treaty's benefits. This is an area of debate in international

acceptance to gain NAFTA accession. The treaty's accession

law, and, as regional trade blocs increase in number and

clause states the following:

importance, the debate intensifies. Turkey seeks membership
in the European Union (EU), but EU members, for various

I. Any country or group of countries may accede to

political and economic reasons, will not allow Turkey's entry.

this Agreement subject to such terms and conditions

The case of Quebec is unique because it will have unique sta-

as may be agreed between such country or countries

tus as a past key player on the inside that pushed for

and the Commission and following approval

NAFTA's creation and ratification. NAFTA, however, gives no

accordance with the applicable legal procedures of

special consideration to any outside state, even if the state was

each country.

once a part of the agreement. Because NAFTA's accession

2.

clause empowers its members, as does the EU's, Quebec may

Party and any acceding country or group of countries

find itself in a similar situation to Turkey's.

if, at the time of accession, either does not consent

NAFTA defines the three original and current mem-

In

This agreement shall not apply as between any

to such application. (NAFTA 1992, Article 2204)

ber-states by defining their territory. Canada is defined as the
following:

The ambiguity and brevity of this clause leaves the preponderance of power and work to the NAFTA Commission, which

The territory to which its customs apply, including
any areas beyond the territorial seas of Canada, with-

will handle accession bids on a case-by-case basis.
The treaty empowers the Free Trade Commission.

in which, in accordance with international law and its

Article 2001 of NAFTA outlines the composition and func-

domestic law, Canada may exercise rights to the

tions of this commission. It is comprised of each country's

seabed and subsoil and their natural resources.

selected cabinet members or other designated representatives.

(NAFTA 1992, Annex 20l.I)

Many duties are listed in the treaty's text, some are obliged
and others are optional. One requirement is that "all deci-

Thus, if Quebec remains a part of Canada, even under a

sions of the Commission ... [bel ... taken by consensus,

revised constitutional system, they will remain a part of

except as the Commission may otherwise agree" (1992).

NAFTA, and their trade relations will continue unchanged. If,

Each member's possession of veto power does not increase the
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likelihood of reaching a decision, especially on an issue as sig-

tal. Quebec, even after an immediate post-secession recession,

nificant as accession with all of its economic and political

would likely meet any major requirements concerning economic

ramifications.

strength. They will probably have a more difficult time win-

The Institute for International Economics published
NAFTA: An Assessment, reviewing certain elements of the

ning unanimous Commission support for their accession bid.
The failure of NAFTA to restrict members from

treaty. In their discussion of their accession clause, they iden-

forming bilateral treaties in addition to the agreement could

tify several Haws:

be the saving factor for Quebec. Chile, another nation vying
to be the fourth NAFTA member, currently has bilateral trade

First, several of the industry-specific provisions of

agreements with Canada and Mexico, allowing it access to a

the pact (e.g., auto and textiles origin rules) were

significant portion of the NAFTA market.

designed without reference to their possible extension

formed bilateral agreements with either the U.S. or Canada,

to additional countries. Second, the three countries

its economy would stabilize and could subsist even during an

did not spell out either the application procedures or

extended NAFTA exclusion period.

If Quebec

the application procedures or the criteria that new
members would have to meet to join the club.

In

addition, each country remains free to form its own
network of FTAs with other countries that do not

SOVEREIGN QUEBEC'S BID FOR NAFTA ACCESSION:
UN BLOCAGE PERMANENT?

There are many possible scenarios of a sovereign

wish to join NAFTA or are blackballed from NAFTA

Quebec seeking NAFTA accession. International law does not

membership. (Hufbauer and Schott 1993, 114- 15)

provide answers as Quebec's case involves a dispute within an
economic treaty that has not been tested in such a manner.

NAFTA's ambiguity on these issues is either a sign of a hastily

Quebec's situation as a new state seeking access to a trilateral

constructed treaty or a set of intended loopholes. Because

economic treaty to which it was a party as a part of one of the

four years have passed since the treaty was first ratified and

charter members is unique, and this scenario is not addressed

no changes have been made, it seems likely that these "Haws"

by the treaty. Thus, the results of Quebec's NAFTA dispute

are planned loopholes, providing Hexibility.

will create new precedent.

This Hexibility creates some interesting possibilities.

Quebec's first move following secession will be to

First, the various concessions in the treaty, which were not

apply with Canada for a Quebec-Canada economic union.

drafted with additional members in mind, would certainly

This union will benefit Quebec because of trade and invest-

require amendment before more states gain NAFTA accession.

ment Hows between the two nations, and it will ease currency-

For instance, if nations of the Caribbean Basin, a very low-

sharing dilemmas.

cost textile producer, were admitted, current members would

creates a new currency. Canada, however, will not enter into

have to renegotiate portions of the agreement concerning tex-

such an agreement unless Quebec assumes a large part of the

tiles. The extent of such renegotiations is unclear and would

federal debt, perhaps larger than separatist leaders feel Quebec

depend on the situation. The United States has expressed a

is responsible for. Quebec could also use the debt issue in an

desire to avoid large-scale NAFTA renegotiations, and, if such

attempt to coerce Canada into an agreement by threatening to

negotiations would accompany a country's accession bid, the

refuse all debt payment; however, this is unlikely as its nega-

United States would likely block it.

tive effects on Quebec's economic and political image would

The second Haw, NAFTA's lack of specific requirements, allows politics to have a greater role in Commission
decisions. In, Quebec's case, this would probably be detrimen-

Quebec will face serious difficulties if it

cancel any short-term economic gains.
If Canada does not allow a Quebec-Canada economic
union package, Quebec will seek to form a similar agreement

32.
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with the United States and Mexico. Because there are no

Article 2204). Quebec's bid must pass through the

NAFTA restrictions against forming bilateral agreements, the

Commission and meet the legal standards of each country.

dilemma faced by the United States would be whether agree-

The NAFTA Commission is the central player in

ment to such a treaty would damage U.S.-Canada relations.

accession cases. The Commission consists of cabinet-level

Out of frustration or anger, Canada could use political lever-

representatives from each member-state. Because all binding

age and economic threats to block Quebec's entry into a bilat-

decisions of the Commission must be by consensus, each state

eral agreement with the United States.

has veto power. Canada will be able to block Quebec's acces-

However, the

Northeast relies heavily upon Quebec trade, and it is doubtful

sion via the Commission. Quebec will have compelling argu-

that the United States would sever such trade relations. In

ments to make before the Commission. First is Quebec's eco-

fact. Quebec is the U.S. eighth largest trading partner and

nomic strength, placing them far ahead of any non-NAFTA

tremendous cross-border investment links the regions (Nunez

countries in the Western Hemisphere (Nunez 1996, Lexis

1996, Lexis Nexis). Canada's threats could be minimized by

Nexis). Second, Quebec has always been an advocate of free

considering that a U.S.-Quebec agreement would probably not

trade. Both the Bloc Quebecois and the Party Quebecois were

be enough to cause Canada to sever itself from the largest

behind NAFTA, and their strong support made a difference in

economy in the world. Thus, it is quite possible that Quebec

NAFTA's successful ratification, compensating for the rest of

would at least have access to the U.S. market through some

Canada's noncommittal attitude (Lexis Nexis).

sort of bilateral agreement. However, any agreement made by

In order to gain NAFTA accession. Quebec must

Quebec will be costly for the Quebecois. Renegotiations give

obtain consensus and meet each member's applicable legal

states a time to assess the costs and benefits of agreements;

standards. Meeting such legal procedures could include

when the renegotiations are between two parties not on equal

receiving congressional support and the support of the

grounds, the weaker party suffers. In this case, Quebec would

Canadian Parliament. Again, Canada will likely be the biggest

suffer. NAFTA gives certain sectors of the Quebecois econo-

obstacle. Parliament will be even less likely to support

my certain benefits and protections (NAFTA 1992); these

Quebec's accession than the Commission members because it

protections would not last through renegotiations. Such

will be more representative of the views of the Canadian peo-

incentives are usually mutually granted at the time of original

ple, who are most likely to be embittered against Quebec.

treaty negotiation, but when one party already has these pro-

There is also some question over whether or not Canada will

tections, reciprocity for the sake of being friendly is unlikely.

even recognize Quebec's secession. Canada may declare

Once Quebec has secured a bilateral agreement, it

Quebec's claim of sovereignty unconstitutional. This would

will seek membership in NAFTA. A preceding bilateral agree-

render parliamentary ratification impossible, and an interna-

ment is significant for two reasons. First. NAFTA accession

tional self-determination fiasco would ensue.

negotiations will take time, and a bilateral agreement will pro-

It seems that immediately following Quebec's seces-

vide Quebec's economy with some sustenance during that

sion, Canada would act to punish Quebec, blocking their

time. Second, because NAFTA's accession clause is vague,

entry into trade agreements or, at least, requiring stiff terms

with so much depending on the Commission, the favor of one

of entry. In the long run, however, Canada could not afford

or more members will be significant in negotiations.

to ignore the markets of Quebec. Ontario and Western

The NAFTA accession clause states that a country

Canada depend on trade with Quebec and investment in

can gain access to the agreement "subject to such terms and

Quebec's markets, and over time these concerns will likely pre-

conditions as may be agreed between such country ... and the

vail. For Quebec, the critical variable is the duration of the

Commission and following approval in accordance with the

long run. A severance from all of NAFTA's markets for five to

applicable legal procedures of each country" (NAFTA 1992,

ten years would cripple Quebec economically. Even a bilateral

RYAN GEOFFREY BAKER
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agreement with the U.S. over this period of time would not be

thirds of the NAFTA members, if not already the fourth

able to completely replace the trade Quebec does with the rest

NAFTA member, will watch intently. Other nations will also

of Canada. Unfortunately for Quebec, there is no way to cir-

watch and learn from Quebec's scenario as they make their

cumvent the Canadian Free Trade Commission veto. Quebec

own cases for NAFTA accession.

could submit the matter to the World Trade Organization

North America will not exclude Quebec from

(WTO) or the United Nations (UN), assuming that Quebec

NAFTA indefinitely; Quebec's markets are too valuable.

gains membership in these organizations. In these forums,

Thus, the question is how long Quebec's accession will take.

they could argue that Canada is only blocking their NAFTA

If Quebec is blocked from NAFTA for an extended period of

entry out of anger and frustration and that Canada's actions

time, say ten years, the Quebecois economy may whither; this

are an unfair form of punishment. Quebec's legal case would

would certainly have adverse effects on its neighbors. If

be weak at best. Quebec would not have any case at all until

Quebec gains quick access, nations like Chile will argue their

it had completely exhausted its options under the treaty, and

accession cases more vehemently, claiming some form of dis-

this would take some time.

crimination or unfair treatment. Such states may even call for

Secession from Canada will inevitably be costly to

an international tribunal or an arbitration panel under the

Quebec. The price of statehood for the Quebecois would be

WTO to rule on their right to NAFTA access. The possibili-

exclusion from the world's largest free-trade agreement.

ties are endless in the ever-changing field of international law.

Although it seems likely that Canada and the U.S. will eventu-

Thus, while Quebec's separation will not be un blocage per-

ally allow Quebec to enter their markets via bilateral agree-

manent; it will be un bloc age significant, resulting in new

ments and or NAFTA, this will only occur after political ten-

international legal precedent.

sions have subsided; this could take ten years or more (Fry
1997). Thus, although Quebec's secession will not result in a
bloc age permanent from NAFTA, it will sever the region from
its economic lifeblood for an undetermined period of time--a
bloc age significant.
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